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EFFECT OF REPRESENTATION ON A
CLAIMANT'S SUCCESS RATE-
THREE STUDY DESIGNS
William D. Popkin*
L awyers familiar with the adversary process are likely to assume that
a representative will help a claimant win.1 However, that assump-
tion may be incorrect in a nonadversary proceeding involving claims
against the government, where a hearing officer sympathetically de-
velops the claimant's case and the government is not represented. In
that setting, a representative might help a hearing officer gather and
clarify evidence, but the absence of the representative might not
dampen the hearing officer's zeal for developing the claimant's case.
2
The effect of representation on a claimant's chances of success in
nonadversary proceedings is an important issue because it raises ques-
tions about the public's responsibility to encourage representation, es-
pecially in programs involving the delivery of cash, goods or services
to people in economic distress. Other criteria exist for determining the
effect of representation besides a claimant's success rate, such as whether
representation produces accurate results and whether a claimant's sat-
isfaction with the decision-making process is affected by representa-
tion.3 But there are good reasons for focusing on success rates. Given
*Indiana University School of Law (Bloomington). I am grateful to my colleague,
Professor Ilene Bernstein, for reviewing an earlier draft of this paper.
uIn the adversary context, they are probably right. H. KLAVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE
AMERICAN JURY 371-72 (1966).
2Yourman, Report on a Study of Social Security Beneficiary Hearings, Appeals, and
Judicial Review, RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS
CRisis, 168-69, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
94TH CONG., IST SESS. (Comm. Print 1975).
SJ. MASHAW, W. SCHWARTZ, C. GOETZ, P. VERKUIL, F. GOODMAN, SOCIAL SECURITY
HEARINGS AND APPEALS, 28-29 (1978) [hereinafter cited as MASHAW].
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that accuracy is particularly difficult to determine, 4 equal access to the
procedures which produce success becomes a major criterion for fair-
ness. Although claimant satisfaction is an important value, its meaning
is somewhat unclear,5 and there are indications that the results in a
case may dwarf the effect of procedures on claimant satisfaction.
Any decision to encourage representation in nonadversary proceed-
ings has serious financial implications,7 however, and should not be
taken unless we are reasonably certain that representation helps claim-
ants win. Several studies have reported a positive correlation between
the presence of representation and the claimant's success rate,8 but they
do not control for the other factors that could contribute to success.
Dixon's speculation illustrates the problem:
For example, claimants that are confident they are disabled may approach
attorneys more often; but the contrary could also be true, that claimants
with strong cases may avoid the expense of an attorney. Arguably, lawyers
tend to reject those cases with low likelihood of success. . . . More plausible
explanations for the higher [claimant win] rates in attorney cases may be
that the attorneys present the cases better, that a hearing examiner may an-
ticipate that attorney-represented cases are more apt to be appealed and
possibly reversed above, and that some hearing examiners may be favorably
disposed to a fellow professional .... 9
One study undertook a discriminant factor analysis of the hearing pro-
cess, including the representation variable, but could rely on the re-
sults only for conclusions arrived at by other means. 10
4A technique for identifying "potentially erroneous" decisions is described in
MASHAW, supra note 3, at 14-15. It utilizes discriminant factor analysis to predict
outcome. A "relatively short list of characteristics of a case" had high predictive
capacity. The authors suggest that departure from the predicted result, which is the
result an average ALJ would reach, is a good candidate for review by higher agency
officials to see if there are errors. The authors admit to the tentativeness of this
approach, however. Their book does not contain an extensive discussion of "the
methodology, its problems, and its limitations." Id. at 7.
5See, e.g., J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 84-85, 90-91 (1975) (dis-
tinguishing the litigant's view of fairness from the litigant's sense of control and in-
volvement in the process).
6D. HORWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY, 181-82 (1977).
7See Popkin, The Effect of Representation in Nonadversary Proceedings-A Study
of Three Disability Programs, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 1040-48 (1977).
8Id. at 1024-25; Boyd & Johnson, Report of the Disability Claims Process Task
Force, RECENT STUDIES RELEVANT TO THE DISABILITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS CRISIS,
101-102, SUBCOMM. ON SOCIAL SECURITY, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 94TH
CONG., IST SESS. (Comm. Print 1975); R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY AND MASS
JusrICE-A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION, 81-84 (1973). No effect of represen-
tation on success rates was found at the Social Security reconsideration stage in Pop-
kin, supra note 7, at 1024, 1026-27.
9R. DIXON, supra note 8, at 82.
10MASHAW, supra note 3, at 7.
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Understandably, hearing officers whose responsibility in nonadver-
sary proceedings is to protect the unrepresented claimant are skeptical
about a representative's ability to help claimants win."1 But that may
be a self-fulfilling prophesy. Where the hearing officer thinks an attor-
ney is helpful to the judge, there is evidence that claimants are more
likely to win. 12 More surprising is the inpressionistic evidence indicat-
ing that representatives are not very good at performing some of the
tasks that might help claimants win. Thus, one study began with a view
that claimants should be informed about the positive correlation be-
tween representation and success rates,13 but doubts about the repre-
sentative's effectiveness at hearings14 and a concern that ability varied
widely among sub-classes of representatives, led the authors to with-
hold that recommendation.' 5
The difficulty in obtaining hard data about the effect of representa-
tion on success rates arises primarily from problems in isolating the
effect of representation from the inherent winning potential of the
claimant's case in the absence of representation. The failure to solve
these problems renders indeterminate any conclusions about the effect
of representation. Such indeterminacy will seem especially serious to
lawyers. The lawyer's tendency to focus on the individual case breeds
skepticism of the generalities of social science research 16 and guarantees
that weaknesses in the research will be sought out. For a social scientist
addressing an audience of lawyers, it is therefore especially important
11Yourman, supra note 2, at 137-38, 169; MASHAW, supra note 3, at 92.
a2MASHAW, supra note 3, at 23.
131d. at 95.
141d. at 73, 86, 92-93. See also, Yourman, supra note 1, at 168-69. Representation
quality at Social Security hearing stage varies; perhaps one-half to three-quarters of
the representatives are sufficiently knowledgeable.
151d. at 95-97.
A study of AFDC hearings found no effect of representation on a claimant's
chances of success. Handler, Justice for the Welfare Recipient: Fair Hearings in
AFDC-The Wisconsin Experience, 43 Soc. SERV. REV. 12, 30 n. 24 (1969). Attorneys
appeared in 12 percent of the AFDC fair hearings and the success rates were "about
the same" for those who appeared with and without attorneys. Handler also cites
lawyer inadequacies in juvenile court where they are co-opted into dropping their
advocacy role to minimize conflict when there is an on-going agency-client relation-
ship. Id. at 32-33. Perhaps the problem of co-option when there is a continuing
agency-client relationships affects the role of representatives in both AFDC and ju-
venile court proceedings, but not other benefit programs, such as Social Security,
where the claim is not granted as part of an on-going service relationship. See, D.
HORWITZ, supra note 6, at 188-194.
16See L. FRIEDMAN AND S. MACAULAY, LAW AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1 (1969) ("The
sociologists are more eager to mark out boundaries, to seek models for testing; the
law professor far more willing to look at all the data he can find and see what he
can make of it.") See also D. HOROWITZ, supra note 6, at 274.
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to be sensitive to weaknesses in experimental design that prevent an-
swering questions crucial to the formulation of policy. In what follows,
I will discuss three study designs that attempt to solve the problem of
isolating the effect of representation on a claimant's chances of success
and will consider the strengths and weaknesses of each design. I will
use as my example of a nonadversary program the Social Security dis-
ability program. This program has the advantage for research purposes
of applying a statutory definition that is very rich in both technical
and nontechnical issues, of both a simple and highly complex nature.17
The technical issues concern the existence of medical impairments and
range in difficulty from the simplest impairment to those involving
mental illness and pain. The nontechnical issues range in difficulty
from a determination of age and years of schooling to the effect of both
physical impairments and vocational factors on ability to work. Social
Security disability disputes are therefore a good proxy for complex
nonadversary litigation in general. In one respect, however, Social Se-
curity disability litigation is easier to study than other types of litiga-
tion because the results are dichotomous: the claimant is either dis-
abled or not disabled and there is no authority for the agency to
compromise on the basis of hazards of litigation. We do not, therefore,
confront the problem of rank ordering the results of litigation, as in
criminal cases where it might be unclear whether a fine or a five day
jail sentence is worse.
DESIGN NUMBER ONE
MULTIPLE REGRESSION, USING
DATA FROM ACTUAL CASES
If a relationship between two variables, such as representation (the
independent variable) and the determination of disability (the depen-
dent variable), can be explained by alternative hypotheses, such as the
1742 U.S.C. § 423(d)
(1) The term "disability" means-(A) inability to engage in any substantial gain-
ful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im-
pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can
be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. ...
(2) For purposes of paragraph (I)(A)-(A) an individual.. . . shall be determined
to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impair-
ments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work
but cannot, considering his age, education and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether
he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding
sentence (with respect to any individual), "work which exists in the national
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potential of a case for winning without regard to representation, a
common statistical procedure is to identify the other variables that
might affect the decision and, through multiple regression analysis,18
isolate the effect of representation that survives consideration of these
other variables. The first study design discusses the strengths and weak-
nesses of this procedure.
The strengths are obvious. If we are suspicious that representatives
are taking "winning" cases, we gather the data necessary to determine
whether winning characteristics in the absence of representation are
present in cases with representation, thereby explaining the success
enjoyed by represented claimants. There are, however, difficult prob-
lems with this procedure.
A. Identifying and Measuring Variables
1. Identifying Variables
The agency more or less routinely generates a large amount of data,
such as the following:
I. Demographic data
a. age
b. sex
c. race
II. Vocational background data
a. years of education
b. age
c. region in which decision occurs
III. Medical information
a. primary part(s) of body affected
IV. Procedural characteristics of the case
a. region in which decision occurs
b. judge
c. presence of expert advice or witness
d. presence of representative
economy" means work which exists in significant numbers either in the re-
gion where such individual lives or in several regions of the country ...
(3) For purposes of this subsection, a "physical and mental impairment" is an im-
pairment that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological ab-
normalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques.
IsSee F. KERLINGER & E. PEDHAZUR, MULTIPLE REGRESSION IN BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH
(1973); G. WESOLOWSKY, MULTIPLE REGRESSION AND ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (1976); R.
HARRIS, A PRIMER OF MULTIVARIATE STATISTICS (1975).
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It is possible but unlikely that these variables will explain a great
deal of the variance in case outcome and it is therefore necessary to
develop a more inclusive list by developing a better understanding of
the decision-making process. Two ways to develop the necessary under-
standing of the Social Security disability program are (1) direct obser-
vation, and (2) interviews with knowledgeable observers of the litiga-
tion process, such as former and present judges, representatives from
the private sector and legal services, and agency personnel. There fol-
lows a tentative list of outcome-determining variables that might result
from these efforts. The list is only suggestive of the richness of variables
that might affect case outcome:
I. Type of evidence variables
a. number of medical reports supplied by claimant
b. quality of medical evidence supplied by claimant
c. reputation of doctor(s) supporting claimant
d. claimant's demeanor (if there is a face-to-face meeting with
the hearing officer)
II. Vocational background
a. level of unemployment in the community1 9
III. Medical information
a. severity of particular impairment
b. number of parts of body impaired
c. particular combinations of medical impairments
IV. Procedural characteristics of case
a. type of representative (lawyer, nonlawyer, etc.)
b. cross-examination
c. length of hearing
In the Social Security disability program, we seem to be fortunate in
having a recent agency regulation listing variables which the agency
considers important in finding disability when information about the
claimant's medical impairment does not dispose of the case or the
claimant is not obviously disabled.2 0 These variables are:
I. Age
II. Education level
III. Work experience (skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled)
19For research purposes, it does not matter that this variable should not be con-
sidered by the hearing officer because the program is a disability rather than an un-
employment program. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509(b) (1978). If hearing officers use this
variable to determine outcome, it belongs in the study.
2020 C.F.R. § 404.1503-§ 404.1513; 20 C.F.R. app. 2 § 404(P) (1978).
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IV. Transferability of skills
V. Residual functional capacity based on exertional factors (the abil-
ity to do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work)
However, there is evidence that the predictive capacity of these vari-
ables is slight, perhaps because they are relevant in close cases decided
on other grounds.21
2. Categories of Variables
Once the outcome-determining variables are identified, we must de-
velop the categories of those variables that explain outcome. For ex-
ample, the agency has concluded that certain age categories are useful
in deciding cases22 and, if these age categories predict results and are
not merely normative rules disregarded by the hearing officers, they
should be used by the researcher. Categorizing the age variable is easy,
however, compared to other variables. Agreeing on a meaningful set of
categories for ranking the severity of the medical impairment and the
reputation of expert witnesses will be extremely difficult.
3. Measurement
The next step is to measure each case with respect to the variables.
Where findings are not controversial (for example, race, sex, or the
presence of an expert), this is not difficult. Even apparently subtle judg-
ments, such as the individual's residual functional capacity for work,
might be the product of a series of mechanical and uncontroversial
tests (e.g., the ability to lift weight).23 In many cases, however, there
will be two fundamental problems with measuring variables. First,
accurate measurement of variables, such as the quality of medical evi-
dence, is extremely difficult. Knowledgeable observers may not solve
the problem. These issues are, after all, the very ones that cause judges
the most difficulty and on which there is likely to be a wide variety of
opinion. Doubts about the measurement process would be reduced if
several observers were consistent in their measurements but the use of
more than one observer per case raises research costs.
Second, the measurement of variables that are not mechanical and
uncontroversial is likely to be influenced by the observer's view of the
overall outcome of the case. Evaluation of the evidence and findings of
intermediate facts on which the ultimate finding of disability is based
21MASHAW, supra note 3, at 19.
2220 C.F.R. § 404.1506; 20 C.F.R. app. 2 § 404(P) (1978).
2320 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 404.1510: 20 C.F.R. app. 2 § 404(P) (1978).
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(such as transferability of skills) 24 are not easily isolated from the ulti-
mate decision. For this reason, the agency's findings on intermediate
facts, such as the transferability of skills, may not be reliable for the
researcher's purpose and, for the same reason, we may suspect .he ob-
server's measurements. The problem cannot be dismissed as mere bias.
Every decision-making process is a creative process in which "facts"
take shape in the light of the broader outcome for which they are
relevant.2 5 The distortion in research findings that this can create is
seen from the following example. If the claimant is considered dis-
abled, the observer (or hearing officer) may find that the claimant does
not have transferable skills, because that finding makes the case ap-
pear more favorable to the claimant on the ultimate issue of disability.
If the claimant in this case had a representative, the representative will
appear less useful than he or she might actually have been, because the
case will appear easier to win than it actually was, as a result of the
distorted finding on skill transferability.
This distortion could be reduced by obtaining measurements from
those who are unlikely to be concerned with case outcome. For ex-
ample, doctors could judge physical impairment and vocational experts
could judge transferability of skills. It is in the expert's nature to lose
sight of the overall case outcome and, for that very reason, their judg-
ments on intermediate facts might not be distorted, at least by out-
come considerations.
B. Representative Interaction with Variables
Even accurate measurement will not isolate the raw facts of the case
as they would exist without representation. In this study design, case
observations are made after the representative has used his persuasive
and investigative skills to mold the raw material presented to him by
his client. The case may look easy to win (skills are nontransferable,
etc.), but only because the representative made it look easy. For ex-
ample, suppose we find a positive correlation between (1) representa-
tion and nontransferable skills, and between (2) nontransferable skills
and a finding of disability, but no correlation between (3) representa-
tion and a finding of disability, controlling for skill transferability.
Representatives might still be helpful by shaping the facts on the issue
of skill transferability so that the hearing officer would be able to find
for the claimant. But this research result is equally compatible with
2420 C.F.R. § 404.1511(e); 20 C.F.R. app. 2 § 404(P) (1978).
25Fuller, An Afterword: Science and the Judicial Process, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1604,
1615-16 (1966). Facts carry with them a heavy but unmeasurable contamination of
law.
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the conclusion that representatives are taking cases to a tribunal that
would have been there anyway and that would have resulted in a find-
ing of nontransferable skills without a representative. Nothing in mul-
tiple regression analysis can unravel this interaction. At most, such a
finding could trigger a close examination of cases in which represen-
tation is associated with the variable that makes the case easier to win
(e.g., nontransferable skills), to see whether we can find out if the pres-
ence of the variable resulted from the representative's efforts.
In summary, design number one has two major problems: measuring
difficult-to-measure variables and isolating case potential when case ob-
servation occurs after a representative has entered the case.
DESIGN NUMBER TWO
PREDICT OUTCOME WITHOUT REPRESENTATION;
ASSIGN REPRESENTATIVES TO CASES AFTER
OUTCOME IS PREDICTED; COMPARE ACTUAL OUTCOME
AND PREDICTED OUTCOME
Another approach to determining case potential without regard to
representation is to develop a reliable prediction of outcome without
representation and then assign representatives to these cases to see if
they make a difference. The basic outline of this study design is as
follows:
STEP 1 Knowledgeable observers would observe a series of actual
cases in which there was no representation and would at-
tempt to predict case outcome. They would be asked to
predict outcome at various stages of the decision-making
process, such as after intake, after development of the evi-
dence by agency personnel, and after a hearing (if any).
Their efforts to predict outcome would be compared with
actual outcome. Observers who were good predictors of ac-
tual outcome would then be selected.
STEP 2 The selected observers would predict the outcome of an-
other group of cases in which there was no representation.
Representatives would then be assigned to this group of
cases after the outcome prediction had been made. The ac-
tual results with representation would be compared to the
predicted results to obtain a measure of the effect of repre-
sentation. By predicting outcome and assigning represen-
tation at various stages of the decision-making process, we
can also determine whether it matters at what stage a rep-
resentative enters the case.
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The theory behind this study design is to avoid the problems of
measuring outcome-determining variables and of isolating case poten-
tial after representatives are present, both of which existed in the first
study design. As we will see, however, study design number two pre-
sents problems of its own.
A. Measurement
The primary question asked of knowledgeable observers in this study
design is a prediction of outcome. These observers should, therefore,
have a different perspective from the observers in study design num-
ber one, who were asked to focus on medical or vocational questions,
not overall outcome. Study design number two would use experts in
predicting outcome, such as representatives and hearing officers, rather
than doctors or vocational experts. Such observers might, however, have
their own biases; representatives, for example, might doubt that an
unrepresented claimant could win.
B. Omission of Cases with Representation
In study design number one, observations were distorted by the in-
clusion of cases with representation, after interactions between the
basic facts of the case and representatives had occurred. In this study
design, we correct that problem by observing only cases without rep-
resentation. This allows us to predict outcome when the claimant is
unrepresented so that the effect of representation can be determined
after assigning a representative to the case. However, the omission of
cases in which claimants have selected their own representative could
distort the findings if the omitted cases are different in important re-
spects from cases without representation. Thus, if representatives take
cases which are borderline cases, in which they can help the claimant
win, but unrepresented claimants have such weak cases that no repre-
sentative can help, study design number two will not observe an effect
of representation, even though representatives are helpful. It goes with-
out saying that we cannot forbid representation so that all cases will be
included in our research population. Unless there are only a few rep-
resented claimants, their omission from the study will be a serious
problem.
One way to deal with this problem is to gather the same type of data
gathered in study design number one for all cases, whether or not there
is a representative, to see whether the cases in which claimants select
their own representatives and the cases with unrepresented claimants
differ in any significant respect. But this procedure has the shortcom-
ings of study design number one, in that the cases with representation
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are not observed prior to any interaction between the "facts" and the
representatives.
Another solution is to use the information gathered from the ob-
servers and the agency about cases without representation to catego-
rize the cases in terms of the ease or difficulty of winning.26 Unless the
winning potential of cases with representation was so different from
the winning potential of cases without representation that cases of the
former type did not appear in the unrepresented claimant group, we
could use that information to obtain an accurate picture of how repre-
sentation interacts with every type of case, categorized by its potential
for winning. However, we would still not know the winning potential
for cases in which claimants selected their own representatives.
C. Assignment of Representation
The process of assigning representatives to unrepresented claimants
would also present problems if the assignment process altered the way
representation usually occurred. Unlike the criminal bar, there is no
well established bar of disability practitioners and it therefore might
be difficult to replicate in a study the typical pattern of representation.
Moreover, the very act of assignment might create incentives for atyp-
ical behavior by representatives who know their work is being studied.
DESIGN NUMBER THREE
MODIFIED TRUE EXPERIMENT
The purpose of the' first two study designs was to overcome the im-
possibility of designing a true experiment. In a true experiment, rep-
resentation would be randomly assigned and the results for the repre-
sented claimants would be compared to the results for the remaining
control group of unrepresented claimants. Because the randomization
process would produce an experimental and control group that were
identical in all respects except representation, the effect of representa-
tion could be inferred by comparing the two groups. This procedure is
impossible, however, because claimants cannot be forbidden represen-
tation. Claimants who choose their own representative will therefore
self-select themselves out of the study, and we cannot be sure that their
omission is inconsequential because it is the very possibility of a syste-
matic relationship between the winning potential of a case and the
presence of a representative that gave rise to skepticism about the two-
26See MASHAW, supra note 3, at 14, 18-19, explaining how statistical analysis can
be used to devolop an index of factors predicting outcome.
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way correlation of representation and success rates in the first place.2 7
However, the problem of omitting represented claimants from the
study already exists in study design number two. Step 2 of study design
number two assigned representatives to unrepresented claimants, omit-
ting represented claimants from the study, and compared the actual re-
sults with predicted results. Since represented claimants are omitted
in any event, why wouldn't we prefer to randomly assign representa-
tion to a group of otherwise unrepresented claimants and compare the
results in those cases with the results in a control group of unrepre-
sented claimants? We would at least avoid the problem of having to
predict likely case outcomes in the absence of representation, or so it
would seem. In other words, if study design number two is feasible,
why isn't a true experiment possible, modified by omission of cases in
which claimants select their own representatives?
The problem with the modified true experiment is that the group
of unrepresented claimants, from among which we select some claim-
ants for random assignment of representation, is itself unlikely to be
the entire population of unrepresented Social Security claimants or a
random sample of that population. Social Security cases arise all over
the country. A random sample from this population will produce claim-
ants in widely scattered urban and rural areas. Random assignment of
representation to these claimants would be impossible because there
would not be enough of the representatives typically available to So-
cial Security claimants in close enough geographical proximity to the
claimants. The "modified true experiment" therefore would be re-
stricted regionally in ways that could defeat the advantages of the ex-
periment by systematically biasing the cases with respect to the ease or
difficulty with which they could be won. We could, of course, compare
the population in the region studied with the omitted populations. We
would make the comparisons on the basis of those facts which make a
claimant's chances of winning more or less likely. In that way, we can
see whether the regional limitations of the study create a systematic
bias. But it was the difficulty of making determinations about likely
case outcomes that made the modified true experiment an attractive
alternative to study design number two in the first place. It turns out
that this difficulty cannot be easily avoided.
CONCLUSION
An empirical study is like any argument. It results from assumptions
and makes certain points. If the assumptions are wrong or the points
27See text supra note 8.
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tangential, the study is not likely to be very useful. Thus, if represen-
tation is important primarily because it improves claimant satisfac-
tion, the results of a study about success rates are beside the point. If
success rates are relevant, but the study improperly assumes that the
population studied is the same as the population omitted from the
study, the results can be fairly challenged if they are presented as evi-
dence about the entire population.
But lawyers are always making tangential arguments and question-
able assumptions and are accustomed, through argument, to bringing
these weaknesses out into the open. What then is special about social
science research? There are two problems. First, the hard data on suc-
cess rates may dwarf the softer concerns with claimant satisfaction and
deflect attention from the unproven assumptions underlying the re-
search.28 Second, arguments about the assumptions are sometimes rela-
tively inaccessible, except to those trained in social science research.
29
Teaching the lawyers and even judges about social science research is
not a sufficient solution to this problem if they do not also learn how
to communicate decisions to the public in terms that make the deci-
sions understandable and, therefore, legitimate.
The limitations of social science find their mirror image, however,
in the weaknesses of legal argument. The lawyer often retreats to un-
provable assertions as a technique of debate and picks at the assump-
tions of social science research with a tenacity reserved only for social
science. Good social science, by making the assumptions of a research
design both explicit and understandable and by explaining how the
conclusions relate to policy formulation, is the best antidote for the
skeptical lawyer.
2sFor a debate over the effect of mixing hard and soft information, see Tribe,
Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV.
1329, 1359-65 (1971); Finkelstein & Fairley, A Comment on "Trial by Mathematics,"
84 HARV. L. REV. 1801, 1806-07 (1971); Tribe, A Further Critique of Mathematical
Proof, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1810, 1819-20 (1971).
29But see Finkelstein, Regression Models in Administrative Proceedings, 86 HARV.
L. REV. 1442, 1462-67 (1973), for a discussion of how assumptions concerning hetero-
scedasticity were debated in an administrative setting.

